The politics of rice in Burma
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Myanmar specialist Sean Turnell of Macquarie University, Australia recently spoke to The Irrawaddy about the politics of rice, the junta’s bank balance and the possibility of humanitarian intervention. Excerpts from the interview.
The Irrawaddy: The Burmese military announced it would contribute 5 billion kyat (US $4.4 million) for the Cyclone Nargis relief effort. What do you think of the amount of their donation? Sean Turnell: No, not at all. I think it’s the most extraordinarily mean-spirited thing imaginable. I think it’s important to remember, of course, that the regime currently has around $4 billion in foreign exchange reserves that they got from the gas sales. In kyat terms that’s over 4 trillion kyat. So the idea that they’re giving 5 billion kyat in relief funds is the most extraordinarily ungenerous thing imaginable. Also of course, this is the people’s money; it’s not the generals’ money at all. They’ve accumulated all of Burma’s vast export revenue from the gas, which should belong to the people. TI: The junta earns so much money every year from selling and exporting gas. Where are they hiding this money? ST: The Burmese regime is currently earning just over $100 million every single month. If we have a look at the public accounts, what we see is an incredible accounting trick—the regime has logged into the public accounts the gas revenue according to the official exchange rate, which undervalues it by 200 times. Effectively, that means that $3 billion is sitting somewhere. Now what we do know is that it’s sitting somewhere where Burmese people can’t get access to it. TI: Not all the money is really being spent on victims and survivors. Where are the authorities going to use this money? ST: Well, I think we can expect the money to be used in the way they’ve always used foreign exchange—for things like the new capital at Naypyidaw, for the nuclear reactor, if that goes ahead. I’m sure people will remember the 1,000 percent pay increases for senior military personnel and various other wasteful capital projects like that. They are, in a sense, glorifying the regime rather than relieving the suffering, which is certainly the most important way the money could be used at the moment. TI: The Irrawaddy basin is one of the important “rice bowls” in Southeast Asia and very important for Burma’s economy. Since this rice bowl has been destroyed in the cyclone, what will the impact be on Burma’s people, the economy and food security in the future? ST: The effect on the future, I’m afraid, is very poor. In the short term, of course, we’ve seen the destruction of much of the current harvest, but we’re likely to see considerable food and rice shortages for the next couple of years. The damage to the economy is going to be profound because the timing of this could not be worse with the world’s rice prices at record levels and many other countries restricting exports and so on. It’s going to be very difficult to replace the rice that was grown in the delta. On top of all that, we’ve seen communications and transport links destroyed, so it’s going to be very difficult to distribute rice that’s been harvested or which is brought in from overseas. In the medium and longer terms, we have to be worried about the damage to infrastructure, to roads and communications—aspects that we’ve mentioned already. But what is particularly worrying is the inundation of seawater into the Irrawaddy delta. The salinity damage to these rice-growing areas may last for several years. TI: Will there be any impact on the Southeast Asian region? ST: Yes. The whole of Southeast Asia will be impacted by this, because with rice prices really high and the rice shortages at the moment, one might have hoped that Burma’s production would have lowered the general price of rice. So, this disaster is not only going to affect Burma, but the rest of Southeast Asia and South Asia, such as India. The global economy will be affected as well. TI: After the cyclone hit Burma the US eased sanctions on Burma. In your opinion, what will be the pitfalls of this and how can the regime take advantage of it? ST: I think, so far, there’s been an opening-up of contacts between the West and Burma, but it really just relates to short-term issues concerning the actual survival of Burmese people. I think in the longer term, governments are going to take an even harder line because I think the rest of the world has been greatly shocked by these events. TI: Now international governments and the UN are trying to get aid into Burma to help survivors from the cyclone. However, the Burmese government is being very tough about letting relief supplies and assistance into the country. Do you think the UN should do more? ST: Well it’s very difficult for the UN. Frankly, I think that they should do much more than they’re doing. Under the new ordinance, the “Responsibility to Protect,” which came in a couple of years ago, there is a duty for every UN country to do as much as they can here, because it’s quite clear that the regime in Burma is not protecting its citizens responsibly. The international community, under the recent changes to the UN charter, has a responsibility here. What to do, of course, is very difficult. Any sort of intervention can be resisted by the regime. However, it seems clear that some direct intervention is required, and whether this means food drops, or whether it means convoys going into the country under armed guard. Source: The Irrawady |



